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1 Introduction
Since Fama (1970), economists have been examining the efficient market hypothesis
(EMH) in various stock markets. There are three forms of the EMH: the weak-form,
semi-strong form, and strong-form. Most of the previous studies examine the weak-form
and the semi-strong form EMH in the stock markets; but almost none examine the strong-
form EMH. This is because there is no arbitrage opportunity even if they can utilize the
inside information. If the strong-form EMH is true, investors do not have an incentive for
trading. The weak-form EMH is the most well-known hypothesis that asserts that cur-
rent stock prices only reflect historical prices. As Lim and Brooks (2011) point out, many
recent studies on the weak-form EMH conclude that stock markets are almost efficient
but market efficiency changes over time. This means that there is a strong possibility that
an evolutionary alternative to the EMH, the adaptive market hypothesis (AMH) of Lo
(2004), is supported in the stock markets. The AMH reinforces the view that the market
evolves over time, as does market efficiency. It implies that market efficiency can arise
from time to time due to changing market conditions such as behavioral bias, structural
change, and external events.
The semi-strong form EMH asserts that stock prices adjust rapidly to the release
of the price around new public information. We consider that new public information
includes not only corporate financial information but also information on government
policy interventions. In the view of corporate financial information, several studies show
that financial ratios and macro variables are useful in predicting stock returns, and they
conclude that the semi-strong form EMH is not supported (e.g., Fama (1981); Campbell
(1987); Campbell and Shiller (1988a,b); Fama and French (1988, 1989)). Studies in the
second category, on the other hand, shed light on the relationship between the govern-
ment policy interventions and stock market efficiency (e.g., Davidson and Froyen (1982);
Pearce and Roley (1985); Darrat (1988); Hancock (1989); Bernanke (2004); Ehrmann
and Fratzscher (2004); Laopodis (2009)). This is because government policy interven-
tions might cause the divergence between fundamental value and the prevailing stock
price, and decline the stock market efficiency. However, whether the stock prices reflect
the information on government policy interventions and whether the semi-strong form
EMH is supported or not remain controversial (see Fama (1991), Becker et al. (1996),
and Malkiel (2003) for details).
Furthermore, several recent studies examine how the central bank’s unconventional
monetary policy affects the stock market. Chuliá et al. (2010) explore the Federal Re-
serve’s announcement effect for the federal funds target rate changes on the stock prices,
volatilities, and correlations. They find that the stock market responds differently to pos-
itive and negative target rate surprises. Ueda (2012) examines how the Bank of Japan
(BOJ)’s unconventional monetary policy strategies affect the stock prices. He concludes
that the strategies except for quantitative easing move the stock prices in the expected
directions. In December 2010, the BOJ introduced the purchasing exchange-traded funds
(ETFs) program and has been rapidly expanding the purchasing scale after April 2013. A
few studies examine the effect on the stock markets because the BOJ is the only central
bank purchasing stocks through ETFs. Ueda (2013) investigates the impacts of the ETFs
purchasing by the BOJ and shows that the BOJ’s unconventional monetary policies have
positive effects on the TOPIX and the current exchange rates of the U.S. dollar against
Japanese yen. Harada and Okimoto (2019) examine the cumulative treatment effects on
the Nikkei 225 by the BOJ’s EFTs purchasing program and show the effects on the Nikkei
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225 have already reached around 20% as of October 2017.
As mentioned above, economic policies often cause price distortion in stock markets
and affect the stock market efficiency. We can consider that security prices are almost
efficient in the long-run by rapidly reflecting new information on economic policies because
market institutions and (information and communication) technologies are developed
enough in the present day. However, when those were still developing, the prices did
not always reflect new information on economic policies. In practice, Noda (2019) shows
that the degree of market efficiency in the weak sense changes and evolves over time
using the prewar Japanese stock market data.1 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that
we consider the market efficiency in the semi-strong sense also changes and evolves over
time. Moreover, we can reveal the effect of policy changes on the stock market under the
closed economy because our dataset includes the wartime period. Particularly, we pay
attention to the transition process from the open economy to the closed economy in the
prewar Japanese stock market. We then focus on the relationship between the prewar
Japanese stock market and several government policy interventions to explore whether
the semi-strong form stock market efficiency evolves over time.
Most of the previous studies employ the event study analysis to evaluate the semi-
strong form EMH in accordance with Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969).2
The event study analysis is a very simple and convenient method; however, there is a
serious problem. Particularly, we calculate a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and test
whether the CAR is statistically significantly different from zero on the specified event
windows. We find that the event affects the stock prices when the CAR is statistically
significantly different from zero. We can conclude the semi-strong form EMH is not
supported. Note that the result of the event study analysis provides us estimates of only
the short-run impact, not the long-run impact. Furthermore, the results of the event
study analysis are quite unstable to even small changes in research design as shown in
McWilliams and Siegel (1997). Hence, we adopt Ito et al.’s (2014; 2017) generalized least
squares (GLS) based time-varying vector autoregressive (TV-VAR) model to investigate
the long-run impacts of public information, especially government policy changes, in the
stock markets. In the system of the GLS-based TV-VAR, we estimate the joint degree of
market efficiency that is obtained from the time-varying impulse responses and evaluate
how public information affects the stock market efficiency in the semi-strong sense.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review that
explains this paper’s significance in finance and economic history. Section 3 presents our
empirical method for estimating the joint degree of market efficiency as the measurement
of the semi-strong market efficiency that is based on the Ito et al.’s (2014; 2017) GLS-
based TV-VAR model. Section 4 presents our datasets that include new data of the
performance index for the prewar Japanese stock and government bond markets estimated
by Hirayama (2017a,b, 2018a,b, 2019, 2020a,b) and presents some statistical test results.
Section 5 shows our empirical results using a GLS-based TV-VAR model and discusses
the relationship between policy changes, major historical events, and time-varying semi-
strong market efficiency in the prewar Japanese stock market. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
1We call the period of prewar and wartime as “prewar” in this paper.
2See Brown and Warner (1980) and MacKinlay (1997) for technical details.
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2 Literature Review
This study examines Fama’s (1970) semi-strong form EMH in the prewar Japanese stock
market using Ito et al.’s (2014; 2017) GLS-based TV-VAR model. We expect that our
study provides useful insights into the above-discussed important issues of finance and
economic history. Previous research in the field of modern economic and financial history
can be divided into two types: research on the economic system since the Meiji period, and
research on the history of specific financial institutions and industries. The former focuses
on policy changes and flow of funds. Fujino and Teranishi (2000), Utsunomiya (2013),
and Shibata (2011) systematically depict the structure of flow of funds. These studies
also deal with the flow of funds among economic actors such as governments, households,
corporations, and financial institutions. Typical examples of the latter research are Kato
(1965a,b) and Kasuya (2006), which clarify financial intermediation systems based on
financial data of individual financial institutions. These approaches address changes in
financial intermediation mechanisms or structures. However, as Ito (1999) has pointed
out, to grasp the actual condition of the financial intermediation system, it is necessary
not only to analyze the structural changes described above, but also to take an approach
to reexamine whether the functions of the system are being fully utilized. This is because
improving the financial structure does not necessarily mean an efficient financial interme-
diation function. For example, in the financial system in developing East Asia in 1990,
the financial structure and its function diverged. In this study, we focus on this point
and examine the efficiency of financial markets to clarify whether financial intermedia-
tion is functioning. In this study, we focus on the time-varying nature of the semi-strong
form market efficiency to quantitatively grasp the functions of the stock market in prewar
Japan, which will contribute to complementing conventional studies of economic history.
There have been few previous studies on the functioning of stock markets. In previous
studies, economic policy by Minister of Finance Korekiyo Takahashi from 1932 to 1936
has been one of the main themes of policy analysis in economic history. Many of them
believe that the recovery from the global Great Recession became possible by policy
packages such as fiscal expansion policies, currency depreciation, and monetary easing
policies. However, quantitative studies that have analyzed the effects of this policy are
limited to Shibamoto and Shizume (2014). They explore that this policy had a large
effect on raising expected inflation before seceding from the gold standard system.
Studies on financial markets in the early 1930s have focused on the government bond
market, but not on the stock market. The main monetary policy at that time was
focused on the government bond market and the foreign exchange market. The interest of
policymakers in the stock market was low. In 1932, however, stock prices rose significantly
and the situation in Japan was different from the stagnation of stock indices in Europe
and the U.S. Therefore, it is necessary to reexamine the situation quantitatively. In
this sense, Bassino and Lagoarde-Segot (2015), a financing study on the stock market
before and during the war, is a valuable contemporary study. However, the market data
used (daily data in the Economic Yearbook of the Toyo Keizai (Oriental Economist) will
need to be reconsidered. First, the stock price data do not consider that no correction
has been made to the settlement of rights and additional payments, or the return from
dividends.3 Second, Japanese government bond (JGB) data are limited to 5% coupon
bonds and do not consider changes in spreads by interest rate, nor do they include 3.5%
coupon bonds issued in large volumes after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese
3See Appendix for details.
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War.4 Since the restoration of the gold embargo, as can be seen from the examples of the
BOJ’s underwriting of government bonds and the revision of the Capital Flight Prevention
Law, Japanese government intervention was strengthened in the government bond and
foreign exchange markets earlier than in the stock market. By contrast, in the stock
market, strong government intervention such as the Share Price Control Ordinance and
Stock Price Support Organizations was not implemented until the wartime. Quantitative
analysis of market efficiency will help to identify when government price intervention in
the early Showa period had a significant impact on the market. This is because policy
effects cannot be sufficiently measured only by studying the history of economic policy
at that time and by checking trends inflow of funds. Quantitative assessment of market
impact will also be an effective tool for studying economic history.
The three main issues related to market functions in research on economic history
are as follows. First, there is a view that the stock market stagnated because investors
dropped out after the Showa Depression in 1927 and that the stagnation of the market
continued even after the World War II (WWII). Another view states that although the
price control of the government bond market was strengthened, the degree of freedom in
price fluctuations in the stock market was secured to some extent. The two views on the
stock market could be explored to a certain extent through the time-series evolution of
market volatility and comparisons of other assets. Hirayama (2018a) provides descriptive
statistics such as the stock market price volatility in the U.S. and Japan, and compares
the difference between the markets. Based on the index he calculated, the risk level of
the stock market in the 1940s (until November 1944) was 11.8% in Japan and 13.5% in
the U.S. Although the risk level of the Japanese stock market is relatively low, it can
be said that a certain degree of volatility has been maintained compared with the U.S.
and Japan. Additionally, the yield spread, which is the difference between the yield on
the long-term government bonds and the equity earnings yield, has been rising in both
markets, while the relative positions have changed alternately since the late 1930s. In
terms of the comparison between Japan and the U.S. in the secondary market, it may not
be said that only the Japanese market has shrunk. In this way, it is possible to supplement
the view of economic history by quantitative bilateral market analysis. Second, whether
corporate finance functioned mainly in the securities market or in the traditional banking
industry before and after World War I (WWI) remains debatable. Although the views of
these discussions do not agree, a quantitative understanding of changes in the efficiency
of the stock market and other markets will have certain implications for the discussion.
This will contribute to broaden the scope of this discussion by examining the functioning
of securities markets.
Some studies examine the efficient market hypothesis using the prewar Japanese stock
market data. Kataoka et al. (2004) investigate whether the prewar Japanese stock mar-
ket was efficient using the daily stock prices in 1903 alone. They find that the market is
efficient in the weak sense but the market is not efficient in the semi-strong sense. Suzuki
(2012) assumes known breakpoints and employs the Choudhry’s (2010) method to ex-
amine the semi-strong EMH using the Japanese daily stock market data during WWII.
He finds that market efficiency declined after the start of the war and that the known
breakpoints are consistent with the variation of stock prices. Bassino and Lagoarde-Segot
(2015) explore the weak-form EMH in the 1930s’ Japanese stock market using the gener-
alized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH)-in-mean model and argue
4Additionally, income returns, which account for the majority of total JGB returns, are not consid-
ered.
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that the market deviated from weak-form efficiency. Noda (2019) employs the long time-
series data from 1878 to 1945 and measures the time-varying degree of market efficiency
in the weak sense to test the Lo’s (2004) AMH. He finds that the prewar Japanese stock
market is almost efficient and the degree of market efficiency in the prewar Japanese
stock market varied with time and that its variations corresponded with major historical
events. Suzuki and Yuki (2019) apply the unit root test of Perron (1989) with a known
breakpoint to examine whether stock prices formed efficiently after the Kanto Great
Earthquake. They find that stock prices reflected various data correctly even after the
earthquake occurred and conclude the semi-strong form EMH is supported. Therefore,
whether the semi-strong form EMH is supported in the prewar Japanese stock market
is controversial. We then focus on the time-varying structure of the stock market and
dynamically observe changes in semi-strong form efficiency, after which we should be able
to see the transition of market functions in detail.
Lastly, there is a view that although the primary market for stocks in the prewar and
wartime periods did not function, the secondary market was bloated and speculative.
As pointed out by Kobayashi (2012, p.235), it is important to consider whether the
prewar market was functioning properly by distinguishing between primary and secondary
markets. For the primary market, structural analysis such as institutional changes and
flow of funds will be effective; however, for the secondary market, it will be necessary
to check for speculative movements. Particularly, questions such as whether currency
speculation arising from the restoration of the gold embargo, as described in detail by
Fukai (1941), actually took place in the secondary stock market (synchronicity between
markets), and whether the secondary stock market during the war was affected by external
factors such as the war situation (wartime price fluctuations) will be the subjects of
historical research. From the above perspective, the testing the semi-strong form EMH
in the prewar Japanese stock market may provide some suggestions on the prewar financial
intermediation function in economic history.
3 The Method
We first introduce Ito et al.’s (2014; 2017) GLS-based TV-VAR model to analyze the time-
varying nature of the semi-strong market efficiency on prewar Japanese stock market.
We suppose that pt is a price vector of the three securities (stock, government bond, and
exchange rate) in t period. Our main focus is reduced to the following condition:
E [xt | It−1] = 0, (1)
where xt denotes a return vector of the securities in t period. We calculate that the i-th
element of xt is ln pi,t− ln pi,t−1 for each security. Note that Equation (1) implies that all
conditional expected returns of the three securities at t period given the information set
available in t− 1 period are zero. If xt is stationary, we denote the time-series process of
xt using the Wold decomposition as
xt = µ+ Φ0ut + Φ1ut−1 + Φ2ut−2 + · · ·
= µ+ Φ(L)ut, (2)
where Φ(L) is a matrix lag polynomial of a lag operator, µ is the mean of xt, and ut
follows an independent and identically distributed multivariate process with a mean of
zero vector. We assume that coefficient matrices {Φi}∞i=0 are k×k dimensional parameter
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matrices. We then compute the impulse-response functions along with the identification
assumptions such as Φ0 = I. Note that the EMH holds if and only if Φi = 0 for all i > 0,
which suggests that the market deviation from the efficient market reflects the impulse
response, a series of ut. In this study, we construct a relative degree based on the impulse
response to investigate whether the semi-strong form EMH holds for the prewar Japanese
stock market.
We can obtain that the impulse response is to employ a VAR model and to alge-
braically compute its coefficient estimates. Suppose that the vector return process xt of
the three securities is invertible under some assumptions. Then, we consider the following
standard VAR(q) model:
xt = ν + A1xt−1 + A2xt−2 + · · ·+ Aqxt−q + εt; t = 1, 2, . . . , T, (3)
where ν is a vector of intercepts; εt is a multivariate error term with E [εt] = 0, E [ε2t ] =
σ2εI, and E [εtεt−m] = 0 for all m 6= 0. We can measure a relative degree about the semi-
strong form market efficiency that varies over time according to the following procedure.
First, we compute a cumulative sum of the coefficient matrices of the impulse response:
Φ(1) = (I − A1 − A2 − · · · − Aq)−1 , (4)
We next define a joint degree of market efficiency as the measurement of the semi-strong
form market efficiency:
ζ =
√
max [(Φ(1)− I)′(Φ(1)− I)], (5)
to measure the deviation from the efficient market. We can understand that in the case of
the efficient market where A1 = A2 = · · · = Aq = 0, the degree ζ becomes zero; otherwise,
ζ deviates from zero. Thus, we call ζ the joint degree of market efficiency. When we find
a large deviation of ζ from 0 (both positive and negative), we can regard some deviation
from one as evidence of market inefficiency. Furthermore, we can construct this degree
that would vary over time when we obtain time-varying estimates of the coefficients in
Equation (3).
We estimate TV-VAR coefficients in each period to obtain the degree defined in Equa-
tion (5) in each period. In practice, we employ a model in which all the VAR coefficients,
except for the one that corresponds to intercept terms, ν, follow independent random
walk processes. In other words, we assume:
Al,t = Al,t−1 + Vl,t, (l = 1, 2, · · · , q), (6)
where {Vl,t} is a q× t dimensional error term matrix. We assume that the matrix satisfies
E [Vl,t] = O for all t, E [vec(Vl,t)′vec(Vl,t)] = σ2vI and E [vec(Vl,t)′vec(Vl,t−m)] = O for all
l and m 6= 0. Ito et al.’s (2014; 2017) method allows us to estimate the TV-VAR model:
xt = ν + A1,txt−1 + A2,txt−2 + · · ·+ Aq,txt−q + εt, (7)
together with Equation (6).
To conduct statistical inference on a joint degree of market efficiency in the semi-strong
sense, we apply a residual bootstrap technique to the TV-VAR model above. In practice,
we build a set of bootstrap samples of the TV-VAR estimates under the hypothesis that
all the TV-VAR coefficients are zero. This procedure provides us with a (simulated)
distribution of the estimated TV-VAR coefficients, assuming the three securities return
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processes are generated under the semi-strong form EMH. Thus, we can compute the
corresponding distribution of the impulse response and degree of market efficiency in
the semi-strong sense. Finally, by using confidence bands derived from such simulated
distribution, we conduct statistical inference on our estimates and detect periods when
the prewar Japanese stock exchange experienced market inefficiency.
4 Data
This paper studies the dynamics of the semi-strong efficiency of the prewar Japanese stock
market, investigating how the stock prices (or total returns) responded to policy changes
and external events. That is, we consider not only the stock but also the government
bond and the foreign exchange when we measure the time-varying joint degree of market
efficiency in the prewar Japanese stock market. As stock prices, we utilize the three types
of total return indices that are calculated by Hirayama (2017a,b, 2018a, 2019, 2020a):
the old shares of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (hereafter the old shares), the new shares
of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (hereafter the new shares), and the equity performance
index (EQPI). Note that the EQPI is the capitalization-weighted index while the old
and new shares are based on the stock price of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) and
both are price-weighted indices. Then the government bond performance index (GBPI) of
Hirayama (2018b, 2020b) is used as the government bond prices. Hirayama calculates the
total return for the prewar Japanese government bond and constructed GBPI as a new
government bond price index. Lastly, we obtain current exchange rates of the U.S. dollar
against Japanese yen from the Bulletin of Financial Information (Ministry of Finance,
Japan) and Bank of Japan (1947) as the foreign exchange prices.5
We then construct three datasets for each stock price index. The start periods are the
same regardless of datasets, June 1924. However, the end periods depend on the dataset;
April 1943 for the old and new shares, and August 1945 for the EQPI. The sample periods
of the GBPI and the exchange rate are both from June 1924 to August 1945. We take
the log first difference of the time series of prices to obtain the returns of the indices.
(Table 1 around here)
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the returns. We confirm that the mean (stan-
dard deviation) of returns on the EQPI is higher (lower) than that of the old and the
new shares price index. This means that the differences in the weighting method for
the price index affect the performance of the stock. We also confirm that the standard
deviation of the returns on GBPI is the lowest in all of the securities. This implies that
the government bond was considered a relatively low-risk asset in prewar Japan.
Table 1 also shows the results of the unit root test with descriptive statistics for
the data. For estimations, all variables that appear in the moment conditions should
be stationary. We apply the Elliott et al.’s (1996) augmented Dickey–Fuller generalized
least squares (ADF-GLS) test to confirm whether the variables satisfy the stationarity
condition. We employ the modified Bayesian information criterion (MBIC) instead of
the modified Akaike information criterion (MAIC) to select the optimal lag length. This
is because from the estimated coefficient of the detrended series, ψˆ, we do not find the
possibility of size-distortions (see Elliott et al. (1996); Ng and Perron (2001)). The ADF-
5Please see the appendix at the end of this paper on how the dataset is constructed.
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GLS test rejects the null hypothesis that the variables (all returns) contain a unit root
at the 5% significance level.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Preliminary Estimations
We first assume a time-invariant VAR(q) model with constant parameters and employ
Schwarz’s (1978) Bayesian information criteria to select the optimal lag order in our
preliminary estimations. Table 1 summarizes our preliminary results for a time-invariant
VAR(q) model using the whole sample. In the estimations, we choose first-order vector
autoregressive (VAR(1)) models for all estimations.
(Table 2 around here)
Table 2 shows that (1) the VAR estimates of the old and new shares are almost similar,
and (2) the estimates of RS,t−1 of the EQPI is smaller than those of the old and new
shares. This means that when we consider the semi-strong form market efficiency, the
EQPI is the most efficient in the prewar Japanese stock market. Note that because of
this result as well as the limited explanatory power of time-invariant VAR models, we
should pay more attention to the time-varying nature of the semi-strong market efficiency
on the prewar Japanese stock market.
We employ Hansen’s (1992) parameter constancy test under the random parameters
hypothesis to detect whether the parameters are constant in the above VAR(q) models.
Table 2 also presents the test statistics; we reject the null of constant parameters against
the parameter variation as a random walk at the 5% significance level. Therefore, we
estimate the time-varying parameters of the above VAR models to investigate whether
gradual or rapid changes occur in the prewar Japanese stock market. These results
suggest that the time-invariant VAR(q) model is not suitable to explain our data and
that the TV-VAR(q) model is a better fit.
From a historical viewpoint, the prewar Japanese economy experienced various ex-
ogenous shocks such as bubbles, economic or political crises, policy changes, and wars.
Table 3 summarizes the major historical events in the prewar Japanese economy.
(Table 3 around here)
We consider that the events affected the stock price formation. Accordingly, we estimate
the joint degree of market efficiency using the GLS-based TV-VAR model in the next
subsection.
5.2 Time-Varying Joint Degree of Market Efficiency
(Figure 1 around here)
Figure 1 shows that the joint degree of market efficiency in the prewar Japanese stock
market fluctuated over time.6 We confirm that the variation of the degrees looks similar
6Note that are some related studies about examining the weak-form EMH in prewar Japan such as
Ito et al. (2016, 2018). They estimate the time-varying degree of market efficiency in the prewar Japanese
rice markets and find that the market efficiency changes through time.
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when we use the old and new shares as the stock. First, the degrees declined from
December 1925 to January 1926. From the end of 1925 to 1926, the Japanese stock
market showed an upward trend due to the influx of money into the stock market, which
had been abundantly supplied by monetary easing. In April 1925, the official discount
rate was lowered as demand for money stagnated on the back of austerity measures.7
After 1926, however, the rise in stock prices ended as the yen appreciated against the
U.S. dollar due to heightened speculation about the lifting of the gold embargo. Hence,
the Japanese stock market seems to have faded away from expectations of a strong yen
and economic austerity, which had been fueled by speculation about the lifting of the gold
embargo. The total return index of the EQPI also rose until February 1926. However, it
can be confirmed that the rate of increase of the old and new shares is much higher than
that of EQPI.
In practice, the total return index of the EQPI increased by 12.0% between Decem-
ber 1925 and February 1926, while the total returns of TSE (spot transaction) and the
new TSE (short-term clearing transaction) increased by 37.6% and 36.8%, respectively,
showing that the stock investment performance of the TSE has been overwhelmingly en-
hanced. This may be because the additional payment of the new shares was decided on
January 8, 1926 (the payment date is April 1, 1926), and the stock price was expected
to rise. The additional payment of new shares was seen as an indication of the firm’s
strong demand for funds despite the increased burden on shareholders. Therefore, ex-
pectations for a rise in stock prices increased and speculative money flowed into the new
shares of the TSE. The new shares of the TSE may have been overreacting, partly due to
the increase in trading volume on the exchange. For example, when the TSE decided to
make additional payments in December 1931, in a case, the stock price of the TSE was
higher than that of the EQPI due to an increase in speculative interest. This may suggest
the following two points. The first point is that changes in the efficiency of individual
stocks are affected by the impact of additional payments. In the efficiency test, studies
that rely on individual stock data are not appropriate because they include this noise.
Therefore, when examining the efficiency of the prewar stock market, an index that in-
cludes a large number of stocks (all stocks if possible) should be used. The second point
is that even an index containing a large number of stocks has a phase in which efficiency
declines (June 1932), suggesting that efficiency for the entire market has changed. A test
using an appropriate stock index after making various adjustments would contribute to
a sophisticated analysis of prewar stock market efficiency.
During the second half of 1928, the old and new shares of TSE rallied mainly on
the back of low interest rates and monetary easing (see Tokyo Stock Exchange (1933,
pp.39–40) for details), but in May 1929, the stock market was upset by rumors that the
government was likely to lift the gold embargo.8 As the yen continued to appreciate
toward the end of the year, the stock market plummeted, led by the old and new shares
of the TSE. The difference between the old and new shares of the TSE is the variation of
degrees after the Pacific War occurred in December 1941. The degree of the new shares
rapidly declined, but the degree of the old TSE did not. When stock prices were expected
to rise, Oyafuko-Souba (lack of filial piety markets; new share is more expensive than old
share or child share is more expensive than parent share) frequently appeared on the
stock market before WWII. For most of the period since March 1932, the old and new
shares of the TSE shares have been in Oyafuko-Souba. Oyafuko-Souba means that the
7See Tokyo Stock Exchange (1974, pp.42–43) for details.
8See Fukai (1941, p.236) for details.
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stock price of the new shares is higher than that of the old shares. Rationally, the new
shares should be lower than the old shares because the dividend per share is reduced
according to the unpaid ratio. Nevertheless, the reason for the emergence of Oyafuko-
Souba is the inflow of speculative money due to the expectation of a rise in stock prices.
In December 1941, the regulatory authority for stock exchanges was transferred from the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry to the Ministry of Finance. On December 26, 1942,
it was decided that stock exchanges would be delisted. Since January 1943, it is clearly
no longer Oyafuko-Souba as the new shares has declined significantly compared to the
old shares. Considering the delisting decision, the premium of the new shares, which had
been positioned as a highly liquid benchmark, rapidly eroded. This significant drop in
the new shares may have been a factor in increasing inefficiency.
On the other hand, the variation of the degree in the case of the EQPI is quite different
from those of the old and new shares. The degree hardly fluctuated except for the period
of the establishment of the foreign exchange control law in June 1932. In summary,
we conclude that market efficiency varied over time because of external events such as
policy changes and wars. These results are consistent with the results of Noda (2019)
who measures the degree of market efficiency in the sense of weak-form using the prewar
Japanese stock market data.
5.3 Time-Varying Impulse Responses
Next, we examine the time-varying impulse responses to investigate how external
events as shocks affect the three indices.
(Figures 2, 3, and 4 around here)
Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the time-varying impulse responses for each security. The non-
diagonal figures indicate that the shock of the foreign exchange rate is the biggest, followed
by those of the government bond and stock. Particularly, it seems that the establishment
of the foreign exchange control law in June 1932 affected the stock and the government
bond through the foreign exchange rate. However, the outbreak of the Pacific War in
December 1941 appears to have little effect on the securities. To explore in detail the
impact of external events, we then confirm the static impulse response in certain periods
by splitting the above time-varying impulse responses. Particularly, we pay attention to
the three periods: (1) the abandonment of the gold standard in December 1931, (2) the
establishment of the foreign exchange control law in June 1932, and (3) the Pacific War
occurred on December 1941.
(Figures 5, 6, and 7 around here)
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show the static impulse response at the above three periods. We can
see that the impulse responses in the case of the outbreak of the Pacific War decay more
rapidly than those of the abandonment of the gold standard and the establishment of the
foreign exchange control law. It means that the markets rapidly reflect the information
of the external events with time. Moreover, we confirm that the instantaneous impulse
response of the outbreak of the Pacific War is incomparable with those of policy changes
respect with the foreign exchange.
As pointed out by Ito (1989, pp.271–278), in spite of the decision to ban gold exports
again in December 1931 and the enactment of the Act on the Prevention of Fund Evasion
in July 1932, there was a time lag before strict implementation of exchange rate controls.
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Particularly, the “Chinese Speculator” speculatively traded Japanese yen in the Shanghai
and Dalian markets, accelerating the appreciation of the yen. It can be said that there
was a strong sense of uncertainty about the government’s exchange rate policy until
the Foreign Exchange Control Law was enacted in 1933. Subsequently, the price keeping
operation by the Wartime Finance Bank started in Summer 1944, and in earnest in March
1945. At wartime, Hirayama (2018b) confirms the difference in the level of volatility
between stock market and government bond and foreign exchange markets. In contrast,
the stock market during the war had, to some extent, a market pricing mechanism.
The price keeping operation by the Wartime Finance Bank started in earnest in March
1945. Hirayama (2018a) confirms the difference in the level of volatility. Therefore, the
sensitivity of the stock market to external information was maintained to some extent
compared with the government bond and foreign exchange markets.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines Fama’s (1970) semi-strong form EMH in the prewar Japanese stock
market using a new dataset obtained from Hirayama (2017a,b, 2018a,b, 2019, 2020a,b).
Particularly, we focus on the relationship between the prewar Japanese stock market and
several government policy interventions to explore whether the semi-strong form stock
market efficiency evolves over time. We consider that government policy interventions
change the semi-strong stock market efficiency through the distortion of security prices
such as stock, government bonds, and foreign exchange. To capture the long-run impact
of government policy interventions against stock markets, we measure the time-varying
joint degree of market efficiency and the time-varying impulse responses based on Ito
et al.’s (2014; 2017) GLS-based TV-VAR model instead of the conventional approach
such as the event study analysis used in most of the previous studies. We summarize the
results as follows. First, the joint degree of market efficiency in the prewar Japanese stock
market fluctuated over time because of external events such as policy changes and wars.
These results are consistent with the results of Noda (2019) who measures the degree of
market efficiency in the sense of weak-form using the prewar Japanese stock market data.
Second, the semi-strong form EMH is almost supported in the prewar Japanese stock
market as well as the results of Suzuki and Yuki (2019). They show that stock prices
reflected various data correctly even after the Kanto Great Earthquake occurred; and they
conclude the semi-strong form EMH is supported. Third, we can see that the impulse
responses in the case of the outbreak of the Pacific War decay more rapidly than those
of the abandonment of the gold standard and the establishment of the foreign exchange
control law. It means that the markets now reflect the information of the external events
to the stock prices faster than before. Therefore, we conclude that Lo’s (2004) AMH is
also supported in the prewar Japanese stock market even if we consider that the public
information affects the stock market.
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Appendix
A.1 Dataset on the Equity Markets
In prewar Japan, the system of payment of stock in installations was adopted for
the issue of stocks of companies. This was a capital system in which shareholders paid
the par value of their shares in installments rather than in full at one time. Hence, the
burden on shareholders to make payments was reduced and smooth capital concentration
was promoted. In principle, a new capital increase by issuing new shares is possible once
the entire par value (most of them are 50 yen) is paid in. The former shares were called
old shares (a fully paid stock) and the latter shares were called new shares (a part-paid
stock). Therefore, one company issued several types of stocks; and at the same time,
they were traded as different stocks. As for shares issued by the Tokyo Stock Exchange
(TSE), which had a large volume of trading, old shares with the face value fully paid and
new shares that were unpaid existed and were simultaneously listed on the exchange9.
Hereinafter, we will be refer to them as the old and the new shares, respectively.
The system of payment of stock in installations has made the calculation of stock
investment performance more complicated by factors such as allotment of new shares
to shareholders and additional payments. Therefore, it is difficult to simply compare
the results of stock investment in the prewar and wartime periods with those of modern
stock investment. It is necessary to calculate accurate investment results by making three
adjustments: correction of ex-right, correction of additional payments, and correction of
dividends. From this viewpoint, three adjustments were made to two types of stocks of
the TSE, which had been treated as representative stocks on the stock market from the
Meiji period to the prewar and wartime periods, to calculate accurate investment results.
Because of these adjustments, three types of indices were calculated: a price index (PI)
linked to the stock price, an adjusted price index (API) with an adjustment of the ex-
rights (old shares) and additional payments (new shares), and a total return index (TRI)
with an adjustment of the dividend rights.
However, while it has the advantage of being able to calculate long-term data and
being an indicator of the degree of activity in the stock market, it is difficult to reflect
the performance of the heavy and chemical industries, which rapidly expanded during
wartime. Hence, it cannot be considered as a suitable indicator of the stock prices of
major Japanese companies. Then Hirayama (2017a,b, 2018a, 2019, 2020a) provide the
monthly equity performance index (EQPI) from June 1924 to August 1945. The EQPI
is a market index of listed stocks on the TSE’s short-term transactions (a kind of future
quotations) in stocks that is weighted by market capitalization (26 issues were listed at
the same time, for a total of 38 issues).10 Since September 1943, the same issues have
9Note that Japanese stock exchanges before the war were listed companies until 1943.
10The shares (a fully-paid stock) represent the following 24 issues: Dalian Stock Commodity Ex-
change, Manchuria Heavy Industries, Nippon Oil, Ensuiko Sugar Refining, Tokyo Electric Light, Nichiro
Fisheries, Kanegafuchi Spinning, Meiji Sugar Manufacturing, Oji Paper, Nisshin Cotton Spinning, Mit-
subishi Mining, Nippon Kokan, Nippon Electric Power, Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship, Dainippon
Jinzo Hiryo, Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Showa Fertilizer, Nippon Mining, Hi-
tachi Seisakusho, Nippon Electrical Industries, Nippon Soda, Kokura Steel Manufacturing, and Rasa
Industries. The new shares (a part-paid stock) represent the following 14 issues: Tokyo Stock Exchange
(New), Kanegafuchi Spinning (New), Nippon Yusen Kaisha (New), Dainippon Sugar Manufacturing
(New), Asano Cement(New), Fuji Paper(New), Dainippon Beer(New), South Manchuria Railway (New),
South Manchuria Railway (Second New), Osaka Stock Exchange (New), Teikoku Jinzo-Kenshi Kaisha
(New), Toyo Rayon (New), Nippon Mining (New), and Nippon Suisan (New).
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been linked to spot transaction price. Particularly, Hirayama calculates with reference to
stock quotes specified in Tokyo Stock Exchange (1928), and Monthly Statistical Reports
(Tokyo/Japan Stock Exchange), and from December 1944 onward, the Nihon Sangyo
Keizai (forerunner of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun).
A.2 Dataset on the Government Bonds Market
In the past, the yields on the 5% Loan (Mark Ko) and 4% Loan (1st issue) were used
as indicators of the prewar and wartime government bond markets. However, analysis of
these individual issues does not show actual investment performance in the prewar and
wartime Japanese government bond (JGB) markets, because yield spreads exist due to
differences in coupon rates. Hirayama (2018b, 2020b) provides a capitalization-weighted
index for all interest-bearing government bonds with a maturity of at least one year
and calculates the monthly government bond performance index (GBPI) for the period
from June 1924 to August 1945 in accordance with the standard methods of modern
bond indices. There are two types of GBPI: the PI and the TRI that also reflects income
returns. Domestic government bonds for the period for index calculation can be classified
into 20 types, and the total number of issues is 268.11 Hirayama refers to the following
resources for calculating the GBPI: the JGB price quotes specified in the monthly average
prices in the Tokyo market stated in the Debt Management Reports (Ministry of Finance,
Japan) from June 1924 to March 1942, and the spot transaction and monthly average
price stated in the Monthly Statistical Reports (Tokyo/Japan Stock Exchange) from April
1942 to November 1944. Because of tighter price controls after December 1944, the bond
prices were fixed, and November 1944 values were adopted.
A.3 Dataset on the Exchange Rate
Data before 1942 are official prices listed in Bulletin of Financial Information (Min-
istry of Finance, Japan) for each fiscal year, and those after 1942 are official prices listed
in Bank of Japan (1947).
11Indexes are calculated for 5% Loan, 5% Loan (Special), 5% Loan (Mark Ko), 4% Loan (1st issue),
4% Loan (2nd issue), 4% Loan, 3.5% Loan, 5% Treasury Bonds, Railway Bonds, Extraordinary Treasury
Bonds (Issued at Discount), 4.5% Treasury Bonds, 4% Treasury Bonds, 3.5% Treasury Bonds, China
Incident (Second Sino-Japanese War) Treasury Bonds, China Incident Treasury Bonds (Special), The
Great East Asia War (Pacific War) Treasury Bonds, The Great East Asia War (Pacific War) Treasury
Bonds (Special), and Grants Treasury Bonds Delivered.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Unit Root Tests
Stock Markets Other Markets
Old New EQPI GBPI Exchange
Mean 0.0017 0.0006 0.0051 0.0046 0.0021
SD 0.0624 0.0653 0.0462 0.0058 0.0299
Min −0.2008 −0.2073 −0.1580 −0.0362 −0.1133
Max 0.2209 0.2258 0.1991 0.0293 0.3229
ADF-GLS −10.9294 −10.9009 −11.0501 −9.7936 −7.3123
Lags 0 0 0 0 0
φˆ 0.3044 0.3068 0.3306 0.4340 0.3215
N 226 226 245 245 245
Notes:
(1) “Old,” “New,” and “EQPI” denote the old shares of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the new
shares of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the equity performance index, respectively.
(2) “GBPI” and “Exchange” denote the returns on the government bond performance
index and the exchange rate, respectively.
(3) “ADF-GLS” denotes the ADF-GLS test statistics, “Lags” denotes the lag order selected
by the MBIC, and “φˆ” denotes the coefficients vector in the GLS detrended series (see
Equation (6) in Ng and Perron (2001)).
(4) In computing the ADF-GLS test, a model with a time trend and a constant is assumed.
The critical value at the 5% significance level for the ADF-GLS test is “−2.91”.
(5) “N ” denotes the number of observations.
(6) R version 4.0.2 was used to compute the statistics.
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Table 3: Major Historical Events in Prewar Japan
Periods Major historical events
January 1926 TSE’s new share price skyrocketed with the announcement of ad-
ditional payment (from 12.50 yen to 25.00 yen).
April 1927 The nationwide financial panic sparked when debates in the Diet
revealed financial difficulties between the Bank of Taiwan and
Suzuki & Co. (The Showa Financial Crisis); The amended Bank-
ing Law promulgated on March 30.
July 1929 The Hamaguchi Cabinet announced the time for the lifting of an
embargo on the export of gold.
October 1929 The Great Crash occurred.
November 1930 Seiho-Shouken (Stock Price Keeping Organization cooperated by
Japan’s Life Insurance Companies) established.
January 1931 The Japanese government lifted an embargo on the export of gold.
September 1931 The U.K. abolished the gold standard on 21 September; With the
rise of dollar buying speculation in the foreign exchange market,
the value of government bonds and stocks declined.
November 1931 Expectations for a re-ban on gold exports rose, and stock prices
started to reverse and rise.
December 1931 The Inukai Cabinet abandoned the gold standard on 13 December;
The TSE’s new share price skyrocketed with the announcement of
additional payment (from 25.00 yen to 37.50 yen). In contrast to
Japan, stock prices in the U.S., U.K., and France were declining.
January 1932 The official exchange rate of the Japanese yen against the U.S.
dollar rapidly decreased.
July 1932 The Capital Flight Prevention Law and The Act on the Calcula-
tion of Government Bond Prices promulgated and enforced on 1
July
November 1932 The Bank of Japan started underwriting government bonds.
May 1933 The Foreign Exchange Control Law enforced.
February 1936 February 26 incident occurred; Korekiyo Takahashi’s economic
policy ended.
July – August 1937 The Second Sino-Japanese War occurred.
July 1941 President Franklin Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the U.S.
December 1941 The Pacific War occurred; The Ministry of Finance transferred the
administrative work of the exchange to the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry.
June 1942 The Battle of Midway occurred.
December 1942 The Japanese government decided to delist the TSE shares.
February 1943 The Operation Ke completed (withdrawal of Japanese forces from
Guadalcanal).
July 1944 The Operation Forager (the Battle of Saipan) completed.
July/August 1944 The Wartime Finance Bank started the stock price-keeping oper-
ation.
March 1945 The Great Tokyo Air Raids occurred; The Wartime Finance Bank
started the stock price-keeping operation (unlimited stock pur-
chase). In July, the Japan stock exchange started the stock price-
keeping operation.
Note: This table is constructed following Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of
Japan (1993) and Fukami (2012).
21
Figure 1: Time-Varying Joint Degree of Market Efficiency
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Notes:
(1) The dashed red lines represent the 95% confidence intervals of the efficient
market degrees.
(2) We run the bootstrap sampling 5,000 times to calculate the confidence inter-
vals.
(3) R version 4.0.2 was used to compute the estimates.
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Figure 2: Time-Varying Impulse Responses (Old Shares)
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Note: R version 4.0.2 was used to compute the estimates.
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Figure 3: Time-Varying Impulse Responses (New Shares)
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Note: As for Figure 2.
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Figure 4: Time-Varying Impulses Response (EQPI)
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Figure 5: Static Impulse Responses (Old Shares)
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Note: R version 4.0.2 was used to compute the estimates.
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Figure 6: Static Impulse Responses (New Shares)
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Note: R version 4.0.2 was used to compute the estimates.
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Figure 7: Static Impulse Responses (EQPI)
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Note: R version 4.0.2 was used to compute the estimates.
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